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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
T:.u Lo*lowing issue is presented foi z e view:
Is there substantial evidence to support the

Commission's finding that Petitioner Hoskings is not
pe—v.
1.

He fail^u tc

rehabilitated?

establish ::na:

jld ::. z be

2.

Based on his capabilities, regular work is

available to him if he is genuinely seeking work?1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Commission ruled that Petitioner Hoskings is not
permanently totally disabled under the Utah Workers'
Compensation laws.

It found that Petitioner Hoskings can

be rehabilitated and that other work is available to him,
after considering his capabilities and limitations.3
The determination whether an individual is permanently
totally disabled is a factual question to be resolved by the
Commission.4

On review of the Commission's findings of

fact, this Court will uphold the findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the Court.5
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

1

The issue of Petitioner Hoskings' permanent partial disability, if
any, was not before the Commission and is not an issue presented for
review.
2
R . at 211 through 214. The Commission's Order dated March 3, 1995 is
attached as Appendix "A".
3
R. at 213.
4
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Company. 717 P.2d 718 (Utah
1986).
5
Van Leeuwen v. Industrial Commission. 270 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 14 (Utah
App. 1995).
6

Id.
2

STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE
This case does not involve the interpretation of a
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation.

Rather, the issue

presented for review is the Commission's factual
determination that Petitioner Hoskings is not permanently
totally disabled under the Utah Workers7 Compensation laws.
The following statutes and rules are, however, applicable :
1.

Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Code Ann. (1974 Repl.

Vol. 4B 1986 Cum. Supp.). 7
2.

Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Code Ann. 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 6, 1986, Petitioner Hoskings, while employed
by the City, suffered an acute left ankle sprain when he
inadvertently stepped down from a truck onto a fire hose
filled with water.
On September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings voluntarily
retired from the City Fire Department and started receiving
his monthly pension under Title 4 9 of the Utah Code Ann.
Because Petitioner Hoskings had twenty or more years of City

7

A copy of Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Code Ann.. (Supp. 1986) is
attached as Appendix W B".
8
A copy of Section 63-46b-16(4) (g) of the Utah Code Ann, is attached as
Appendix U C".

3

service, he also received a retirement incentive in the
amount of $35,187.92 from the City.
On April 16, 1990, Petitioner Hoskings filed an
Application for Hearing with the Commission seeking workers'
compensation benefits for the injury he sustained in the
industrial accident on April 6, 1986.

Following a hearing

on January 8, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
referred the matter to a medical panel.
The medical panel issued a report on May 13, 1992
stating that Petitioner Hoskings is 11% whole person
impaired.

The medical panel made no reference to permanent

total disability.
On August 3, 1992, the ALJ made a tentative finding
that Petitioner Hoskings is permanently totally disabled as
a result of a April 6, 1986 industrial accident.
On August 3, 1992, the ALJ referred the matter to the
Utah Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS).

The DRS

concluded that Petitioner Hoskings did not demonstrate the
physical stamina and endurance to perform sedentary work
activities and that his limitations are permanent.
In December 1993, Petitioner Hoskings was evaluated by
Dr. S. Knorpp.

Dr. S. Knorpp stated that Petitioner

4

Hoskings was not "by definition disabled or unable to
perform or engage in any gainful occupation".
In December 1993, Intracorp performed a vocational
evaluation on Petitioner Hoskings.

In a report dated

December 24, 1993, Intracorp identified specific jobs
Petitioner Hoskings can perform.

Intracorp further

determined that Petitioner Hoskings demonstrated the
capacity to learn and progress within a career field and
would be successful in formal education training which would
prepare him for more challenging and higher paying jobs.
On June 30, 1994, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order awarding permanent total
disability benefits to Petitioner Hoskings in the amount of
$85,800.
On July 26, 1994, the City filed a Motion for Review of
the ALJ's order.

On March 3, 1995, the Commission issued an

Order finding that Petitioner Hoskings is not permanently
totally disabled under Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Code Ann.
(Supp. 1986) because:
1.

Petitioner Hoskings failed to show that he cannot

be rehabilitated.

5

2.

There is regular work available to Petitioner

Hoskings if he is genuinely seeking work.
On April 3, 1995, Petitioner Hoskings filed, with this
Court, a Petition for Review of the final order issued by
the Commission on March 3, 1995.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following is a statement of the relevant facts
relied on by the Commission:
1.

Petitioner Hoskings was born on December 6,

1935.9
2.

He graduated from high school in 1954.1

3.

He attended technical college from 1958 through

1960 and received a degree in electronics.
4.

From 1960 through 1965, he worked as a test

technician for Sperry Corporation.
5.

In 1965, he worked for Litton Industries as a

gyrotechnician.
6.

On January 3, 1966, he started his employment with

the City as a firefighter.1

9

R.
R.
11
R.
12
R.
13
R.
10

at
at
at
at
at

232.
234.
150.
150.
150.
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7.

He worked for the City from 1966 to September 1,

8.

During his career with the City Fire Department,

1988.

he was promoted from a firefighter to a lieutenant and
eventually to a captain.1
i

9.

As a fire captain for the City, he supervised and

coordinated activities of firefighters; inspected the
buildings and grounds facilities; examined fire trucks and
equipment for operational safety and efficiency; responded
to fire alarms; assisted in firefighting; investigated and
determined the extent of fire location and water sources;
managed crews in the fire operation; trained subordinates in
the use of firefighting equipment and techniques; inspected
commercial establishments for fire code compliance and
reported safety violations; compiled other reports;
recommended corrective measures for fire hazards; supervised
and coordinated activities of fire companies fighting
multiple alarm fires; wrote and submitted proposals for the
purchase of new equipment; and prepared recommendations to
the City's emergency plans.15

R. at 150.
R. at 236.

7

10.

On April 6, 1986, while working for the City,

Petitioner Hoskings stepped down from a fire truck onto a
2.5 inch diameter hose filled with water.16
11.

He injured his left ankle as a result of stepping

on the hose.
12.

On April 7, 1986, his ankle was examined and it
18

was determined that he had an acute ankle sprain.
13.

He did not miss any work time with the City as a

result of the April 6, 1986 accident.1
14.

After the April 6, 1986 accident, he continued to

perform his regular duties and responsibilities as a captain
in the City Fire Department.20
15.

On September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings retired

from the City and commenced receiving his monthly pension as
provided under Title 4 9 of the Utah Code Ann.
16.

Petitioner Hoskings did not pursue a disability

retirement under Title 49 of the Utah Code Ann.
17.

Petitioner Hoskings accepted an early retirement

incentive from the City in the amount of $35,187.92,22
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

152.
152.
152.
159.
159.
154.
179.

18.

At the time of his retirement, Petitioner Hoskings

did not inform the City that his decision to retire was
related to his ankle injury.
20.

After his retirement in September 1988, Petitioner

Hoskings developed lung problems and was treated for
pneumonia and pleural effusion.
21.

He received follow-up care for his lung problems

at LDS Hospital in December 1988.25
22.

Dr. M. Collins, a pulmonologist at LDS Hospital,

stated that the lung injury was not related to any on-thej ob event.2*
23.

From April 22, 1990 through September 23, 1990,

Petitioner Hoskings worked at a full-time job with Hamilton
Stores in West Yellowstone, Wyoming as a fire marshal.27
24.

As a fire marshal in West Yello'wstone, Wyoming, he

taught fire safety and did fire protection education at
several stores operated within Yellowstone National Park.28
25.

On April 16, 1990, Petitioner Hoskings filed an

Application for Hearing with the Commission alleging that he

R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

at
at
at
at
at
at

211.
394.
394.
396.
156.
156.
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was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result
of his accident on April 6, 1986.29
26.

In his Application for Hearing, Petitioner

Hoskings claimed that he was entitled to medical expenses,
permanent partial disability and permanent total
disability.30
27.

In 1991, Petitioner Hoskings had planned to do

seasonal work again with Hamilton Stores in West
Yellowstone, Wyoming, but Hamilton Stores wanted to hire
someone to work year-round which Petitioner Hoskings would
not do.
28.

Petitioner Hoskings worked for Hamilton Stores

from May 6, 1991 through June 14, 1991 to train the person
who was to take the year-round position.32
29.

A hearing was held on Petitioner Hoskings' claim

for workers' compensation benefits before an ALJ on January
8, 1992.33
30.

After the hearing, the ALJ referred the matter to

a medical panel in March of 1992.34

29

R. at 1. The Application for Hearing originally referred to an
accident on June 4, 1986. It was determined that the June 4, 1986 date
was in error and that the correct date was April 6, 1986.
30
31
32
33

R.
R.
R.
R.

at
at
at
at

1.
156.
156.
149.
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31.

On May 13, 1992, the medical panel submitted its

report to the ALJ.
^2.

The medical panel found that Petitioner Hoskings'

foremost orthopedic problem was his calcaneal cuboid
arthritis in the left ankle.

It determined that the origin

of this condition was industrial with progression of the
condition having occurred over the years since the 1986
industrial accident.

It concluded that the appropriate

permanent partial impairment rating would be 11% whole
person.

The medical panel did not mention permanent total

disability.36
33.

On or about August 1992, the ALJ made a tentative

finding that Petitioner Hoskings was permanently totally
disabled as a result of the April 6, 1986 industrial
accident.
34.

On August 3, 1992, the ALJ referred the case to

the Division of Rehabilitation Services (DRS) for an
evaluation.37
35.

The DRS performed a one week work evaluation of

Petitioner Hoskings in November 1992.

34
35
36
37

R.
R.
R.
R.

at
at
at
at

149.
149.
157.
158.
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36.

The DRS concluded that Petitioner Hoskings lacked

the physical stamina to perform part-time sedentary work.39
37.

The DRS concluded that, based upon the periodic

self-reports, Petitioner Hoskings' limitations were
permanent.40
38.

In December 1993, Petitioner Hoskings underwent a

vocational evaluation performed by Intracorp.
39.

Based on the evaluation, Intracorp concluded the

following:
(a)

Based on his work experience, education,

intelligence, age and limitations, there are specific
jobs Petitioner Hoskings can perform with some
training.
(b)

Petitioner Hoskings has demonstrated the

capacity to learn and would be successful in formal
training in preparation for more challenging and higher
paying jobs.

38
39
40
41
42

R.
R.
R.
R.

at
at
at
at

159.
159.
159.
160.

R.

at

236,

237,

238,
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(c)

There is no medical opinion which prohibits

Petitioner Hoskings from returning to a full-time work
schedule under appropriate job demand requirements.
(d)

Petitioner Hoskings is viewed as being able

to benefit from professional services and vocational
rehabilitation.43
40.

In December, 1993, Dr. S. Knorpp performed a

medical examination of Petitioner Hoskings and found that he
was "not by definition disabled or unable to perform or
44

engage in gainful occupation".
41.

On June 30, 1994, the ALJ entered her Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding permanent total
disability benefits to Petitioner Hoskings in the amount of
$85,800.00.45
^2.

The ALJ specified, in her Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order, that the issue before her was
a claim for permanent total disability.4
43.

On July 26, 1994, the City filed a Motion for

Review with the Commission.

R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

at
at
at
at
at

236, 237, 238.
226 through 231.
148-49.
148.
191.
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44.

On March 3, 1995, the Commission granted the

City's Motion for Review and ruled that Petitioner Hoskings
is not entitled to permanent total disability compensation
within the meaning of Section 35-1-67 of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act because:4
(a)

He can be rehabilitated.

The report prepared

by the DRS made no distinction between sedentary work
and more strenuous employment.

It did not address the

fact that his employment at Hamilton Stores
demonstirated an ability to work.

It made no reference

to his intelligence, education, adaptability or wide
range of prior work experience.

In contrast to the

DRS, the Intracorp report identifies his training,
experience and abilities.

It specifically addresses

the effects of his ankle injury and other medical
conditions.

It analyzes the foregoing factors and

concludes that he can be rehabilitated.

Intracorp's

conclusion is corroborated by the fact that he found
other work at Hamilton Stores and successfully
performed his employment duties there.

R. at 250, 251.

14

The Commission

was persuaded by Intracorp's' objective data and
subjective analysis.
(b) There is other work available to Petitioner
Hoskings.

The Intracorp report contains a list and

discussion of employment opportunities within his
abilities.
45.

Petitioner Hoskings appealed the Commission's

decision to this Court on April 3, 1995.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The City will argue that the following is substantial
evidence supporting the Commission's finding that Petitioner
Hoskings is not permanently totally disabled.
A.

Petitioner Hoskings missed no work as a result of

his industrial accident on April 6, 1986.

For two years

after his industrial accident, Petitioner Hoskings continued
to perform his regular duties and responsibilities as a fire
captain.
B.

Petitioner Hoskings voluntarily retired from the

City on September 1, 1988 and accepted an early retirement
incentive in the amount of $3 5,187.92.

At the time of his

retirement, he did not specify, as a reason for retiring,
his problems with his left ankle.

15

Since his retirement was

not substantially motivated by the industrial injury, but
primarily due to personal and other reasons, the denial of
permanent total disability was appropriate.
C.

After he retired in 1988, Petitioner Hoskings

worked as a seasonal fire marshal in West Yellowstone,
Wyoming without limitations.

The fact that he did other

work after his retirement is relevant evidence that he is
capable of working.
D.

It was reasonable for the Commission to rely upon

the report prepared by Intracorp.

Intracorp found that

Petitioner Hoskings can be rehabilitated and that u he could
be successful in long term formal training in preparation
for more challenging and higher paying jobs.''
E.

Although the medical opinions in the record

indicate that Petitioner Hoskings may be permanently
partially disabled, the same medical evidence, including the
review by the medical panel appointed by the Commission,
supports a conclusion that Petitioner Hoskings is not
permanently totally disabled.
F.

There is regular work available to Petitioner

Hoskings based upon his intelligence, education,
adaptability, and wide range of prior work experience.

16

A

vocational evaluation performed by Intracorp specifies
employment opportunities within Petitioner Hoskings'
capabilities.

Unlike most odd-lot doctrine cases,

Petitioner Hoskings has transferable skills which make him
employable despite his physical limitations.
In regards to Petitioner Hoskings' issue on permanent
partial disability, the City argues that although Petitioner
Hoskings initially raised, in his Application for Hearing,
that he was seeking permanent partial disability benefits,
further pleadings and proceedings before the ALJ and
Commission narrowed Petitioner Hoskings' claim to the sole
issue of permanent total disability benefits.

There has

been no hearing on the issue as to whether Petitioner
Hoskings is entitled to permanent partial disability
benefits and, if he is, what those benefits would be.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER
HOSKINGS IS NOT PERMANENTLY TOTALLY DISABLED
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED
IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT.
Petitioner Hoskings claims that he is permanently
totally disabled as the result of an industrial accident on
April 6, 1986.

On April 6, 1986, Petitioner Hoskings

17

sustained an acute left ankle sprain when he stepped down
from a truck onto a fire hose filled with water.
He asserts that he is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits based on the odd lot doctrine.

The odd

lot doctrine allows the Commission to find permanent total
disability when a relatively small percentage of impairment
caused by an industrial accident is combined with other
factors to render a claimant unable to obtain employment.49
To qualify as a recipient of benefits under the odd lot
doctrine, an employee must first "prove that he or she can
no longer peirform the duties required in his or her
occupation . . . and must establish that he or she cannot be
rehabilitated".

After the employee has shown that

rehabilitation is not possible, the employer has the
opportunity to "prove the existence of steady work the
employee can perform."

50

The work the employer establishes

is available must take into consideration all relevant
factors including the employee's education, mental capacity
and age, as well as physical limitations.

49
50

Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah App. 1993).
Id. (emphasis added) .

18

The Commission ruled that Petitioner Hoskings failed to
prove that he cannot be rehabilitated.

Further, even if

Petitioner Hoskings could be rehabilitated, the Commission
determined that other work is available that Petitioner
Hoskings can perform.
A determination whether an individual is
permanently . . . totally disabled is a factual
question to be resolved by the Commission and will
not be set aside by this Court unless there is no
substantial evidence in the record to support
•

4-

5

2

it.

The Commission's finding that Petitioner Hoskings is
not permanently totally disabled is supported by the
following substantial evidence.
A.

PETITIONER HOSKINGS DID NOT MISS ANY WORK AS A

RESULT OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND HE PERFORMED THE FULL
DUTIES OF HIS JOB UNTIL HE RETIRED.
Petitioner Hoskings did not miss any work as a result
of the acute left ankle sprain sustained in his industrial
accident on April 6, 1986.

From April 6, 1986, to the date

of his retirement on September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings
performed the full duties and responsibilities of his job as
a captain in the City Fire Department without limitations or

52

Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Company, 717 P.2d 718 (Utah
1986).

19

accommodations.

At no time did he express to the City that

he was a risk to himself, co-workers or the public as he
performed the normal duties of his position.
The fact that Petitioner Hoskings returned to his
normal duties following his industrial accident, without
missing any work time, is relevant evidence in determining
his ability to perform the duties of his occupation.

Not

only is it relevant evidence, the Utah Supreme Court, in
Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Company.53

stated that:

. . . [T]he fact that an employee returns to work
after an industrial injury creates a "rebuttable
presumption that the claimant has not sustained
permanent and total disability".54
Petitioner Hoskings presented no evidence which would
rebut the presumption that he has not sustained permanent
total disability.
B.

PETITIONER HOSKINGS VOLUNTARILY RETIRED FROM HIS

JOB WITH THE CITY ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1988 AND WAS PAID. IN
ADDITION TO HIS NORMAL MONTHLY PENSION, A RETIREMENT
INCENTIVE FROM THE CITY.
On September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings voluntarily
retired from the City Fire Department.

At the time of his

Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Company. 748 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987) .

Id.
20

retirement, Petitioner Hoskings never gave, as a reason for
his retirement, problems with his left ankle which he
sprained in an industrial accident on April 6, 1986.

Since

he did not miss any work after the industrial accident and
performed the duties and responsibilities of his position as
a fire captain, the City treated Petitioner Hoskings'
retirement as voluntary.
Commencing September 1, 1988, Petitioner Hoskings
received his normal monthly pension under Title 49 of the
Utah Code Ann.

Interestingly, he did not apply for a

disability pension under Title 49 of the Utah Code Ann.

In

addition to the normal pension, the City paid him a
retirement incentive in the amount of $35,187.82.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Peck v. Eimco Process
Equipment Company that when "a finding is made and supported
by evidence that the employee's retirement is not
substantially motivated by his industrial injury, but is due
primarily to personal or other reasons, . . .

a denial of

disability benefits [will] be upheld on a basis of voluntary
retirement. "55

Id. at 578.
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It is reasonable for the Commission to conclude that
Petitioner Hoskings' retirement was not substantially
motivated by his industrial injury.

At the time he retired,

Petitioner Hoskings made no mention of his left ankle injury
as a reason for his retirement.

He retired and began

receiving his monthly pension under Title 4 9 of the Utah
Code Ann.

He took advantage of the City's early retirement

incentive and was paid $35,187.92.

The primary reason for

his retirement was personal and economic.
The purpose of the workers' compensation law is to
"secure [employees] . . . against becoming objects of
charity, by making reasonable compensation for calamities
incidental to the employment."

This compensation is not

in the form of damages for injury, but in the form of
payments to compensate for the loss of employability
resulting from the injury.
Accordingly, workers' compensation laws should not be
used to force the public treasury to pay, as an
afterthought, $85,800.00, for a left ankle injury, years
after the employee has retired, in addition to a substantial

Marshall v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984).
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monthly retirement pension
the amount of $35,187.00.

and a retirement incentive in
Petitioner Hoskings is not

employed because he retired, not because he is unemployable
by virtue of an industrial injury.
The Commission correctly ruled that Petitioner Hoskings
should not be paid from the public treasury $85,800.00 for
permanent total disability in addition to his monthly
retirement pension and the $35,187.00 incentive.

He

retired.
^.

AFTER HIS RETIREMENT IN 1988, PETITIONER HOSKINGS

WORKED A FVhh-Tim

JOE AS A FIRE MARSHAL IN WEST

YELLOWSTONE. WYOMING IN 1990 AND 1991.
Petitioner Hoskings worked as a fire marshal for
Hamilton Stores from April 22, 1990 to September 23, 1990
and from May 6, 1991 through June 14, 1991.

As part of his

duties as a fire marshal, he taught safety and fire
protection at several stores operated within Yellowstone
National Park.

In 1991, Hamilton Stores wanted to make the

job a year-round position.

Petitioner Hoskings did not want

to work year-round and, therefore, did not work for Hamilton

Under Section 49-6a-28 (1986) of the Utah Code Ann.. Petitioner
Hoskings receives, as a monthly retirement pension, 54% of his final
average monthly salary.
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Stores thereafter.

While employed by Hamilton Stores, he

fully performed the duties and responsibilities of the job.
There is no evidence that he would not have been able to do
the job if he had been willing to work year-round.59

There

is no evidence that in order for him to perform the job, he
needed to exhibit "superhuman efforts" or rely on the
sympathy of friends.
The fact that Petitioner Hoskings worked, without
limitation, in another job after his retirement, is relevant
evidence the Commission reasonably relied on to support its
decision that he is capable of working and that there is
dependable work he can do if he wants to work.

Since

Petitioner Hoskings retired, he did not need to work in a
year-round position.

Because he worked after his industrial

accident, there is a "rebuttable presumption" that he has
not sustained a permanent total disability.60

He has

presented no evidence to rebut the presumption.
Therefore, the fact that Petitioner Hoskings worked
after he retired supports the Commission's decision that he
is not permanently totally disabled.

Facts paragraphs 23, 24, 27 and 28.

Peck v, Eimco Process Equipment Company, supra.
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D.

ACCORDING TO AN EVALUATION BY INTRACORP,

PETITIONER HOSKINGS CAN BE REHABILITATED.
Petitioner Hoskings was referred to Intracorp for a
vocational evaluation.

Based upon his work experience,

intelligence, age, education and limitations, there are jobs
Petitioner Hoskings can perform.

Further, Intracorp

determined that Petitioner Hoskings would be successful in
long-term formal training in preparation for more
challenging and higher paying jobs.

Intracorp concluded

that there is no medical opinion which prohibits Petitioner
Hoskings from returning to a full-time work schedule under
appropriate job demand requirements.61
It is reasonable for the Commission to accept the
expert opinion of Intracorp that Petitioner Hoskings can be
rehabilitated particularly in light of the whole record
discussed herein.

If Petitioner Hoskings wanted to undergo

training, he could do regular work.

Since he can be

rehabilitated, he is not permanently totally disabled.

Facts paragraph 39.
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E.

THE MEDICAL OPINIONS IN THE RECORD SUPPORT THE

COMMISSIONS FTHPINgg,
Petitioner Hoskings has been treated and evaluated by
several physicians and specialists.

A medical panel,

appointed by the ALJ, reviewed Petitioner Hoskings' claim.
There is no medical opinion which states that Petitioner
Hoskings is prohibited from returning to a full-time work
schedule or that he cannot be rehabilitated.

On the

contrary, Dr. S. Knorpp concluded that Petitioner Hoskings
62

was not permanently totally disabled.

The medical

evidence in the record supports the Commission's
determination that Petitioner Hoskings is not permanently
totally disabled.
F.

TflERP IS STEADY WQfrK PETITIONER HQSKINSS CAN

PERFORM TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION HIS EDUCATION, MENTAL
CAPACITY AND AGE AS WELL AS PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS.
The Commission's finding, that there is work available
to Petitioner Hoskings, is supported by the following
substantial evidence.
1.

Unlike most odd-lot cases. Petitioner Hoskings has

transferable skills.

The Commission found that there was

Facts paragraph 40.
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general work available to Petitioner Hoskings that he could
perform given his age, experience, education and
limitations.
Disability is evaluated, not in the abstract, but in
terms of the specific individual who has suffered a work
related injury.

Odd lot cases generally involve claimants

whose adaptability to the new situation created by their
physical injury is limited by the lack of mental capacity or
education.

A person whose sole stock in trade has been the

capacity to perform physical movements, and, whose ability
to make those movements has been impaired by injury, is
under severe disadvantage in acquiring a dependable new
means of livelihood.63
Accordingly, the odd lot cases most often involve
employees whose work required physical labor.

Many of those

employees were 50 years old or older with moderate or little
education.64

In Marshall v. Industrial Commission, a case

relied upon by Petitioner Hoskings to support his claim, the
worker who was awarded permanent total disability, was a
coal miner with less than a high school education and had a
40 year history of heavy labor in the mines.

63

Marshall v. Industrial Commission, supra.
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In Peck v.

Eimco Process Equipment Company, another case relied on by
Petitioner Hoskings, the worker was 63 years old, had no
formal education beyond high school and worked his entire
life in heavy manual labor.65
Petitioner Hoskings, however, is a high school
graduate.

He completed a one year program in electronics at

Salt Lake City Technical College.

He attended Brigham Young

University for two years majoring in engineering and
completed approximately two years of general education
credits while being employed with Sperry Corporation.
worked at Sperry Corporation as a test technician.

He

He

worked for Litton Industries as a gyrotechnician.
As an employee with the City Fire Department,
Petitioner Hoskings was promoted from the rank of
firefighter to lieutenant to captain.

His duties and

responsibilities with the City included supervising and
coordinating the activities of firefighters assigned to his
station; performing fire inspections of buildings and
facilities; examining fire trucks and equipment for
operational safety and efficiency; responding to fire
alarms; determining the extent of fire location and water

65

Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Company, supra at 575.
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sources; d i r e c t i n g crews in the f i r e operation; t r a i n i n g
subordinates in the use of f i r e f i g h t i n g equipment and
techniques; inspecting commercial establishments for
compliance with f i r e codes; reporting safety v i o l a t i o n s ;
compiling r e p o r t s ; recommending measures for f i r e hazards;
supervising and coordinating a c t i v i t i e s of f i r e companies
f i g h t i n g multiple alarm f i r e s ; writing and submitting
proposals for new equipment; and preparing w r i t t e n
recommendations to the C i t y ' s emergency plans. 6 6

Unlike the

claimants in Peck and Marshall. P e t i t i o n e r Hoskings has
t r a n s f e r a b l e s k i l l s to other occupations. 6 7
Further, a f t e r he r e t i r e d , P e t i t i o n e r Hoskings did in
fact work as a f i r e marshal for Hamilton Stores in West
Yellowstone, Wyoming.
Facts paragraphs 1-9.
P e t i t i o n e r Hoskings' evaluations r e f l e c t that he i s i n t e l l i g e n t and
very capable of learning new t a s k s . In the DRS report of December 1,
1992, the v o c a t i o n a l evaluator reported t e s t r e s u l t s i n the areas of
academic development, i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a c i t i e s and a p t i t u d e s .
Petitioner
Hoskings scored at the Post-High School l e v e l in vocabulary, reading
comprehension, problem s o l v i n g and mathematics; i n the 78 p e r c e n t i l e on
the a b i l i t y t o quickly think and learn when presented with nonverbal
i n t e l l e c t u a l t a s k s , and i n the 95+ p e r c e n t i l e i n abstract a b i l i t y and
the capacity for observation and c l e a r thinking. R.490-491. The
evaluator f e l t that P e t i t i o n e r Hoskings possessed "many personal
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which r e s u l t e d in a competent, w e l l - l i k e d supervisor.
I t appeared that he would experience very l i t t l e , i f any, d i f f i c u l t y i n
a work s e t t i n g , whether i n a supervisory or subordinate r o l e . "
Moreover, he demonstrated "the a b i l i t y to follow verbal i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
w r i t t e n i n s t r u c t i o n s , diagrams, demonstrations and models" as well as
"the a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t i v e l y plan and organize h i s work." Accordingly,
unlike most odd l o t claimants, P e t i t i o n e r Hoskings can learn t o do other
jobs i f he i s genuinely pursuing other work.
(R. at 493-494.)
7
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It is reasonable for the Commission to conclude that
Petitioner Hoskings can perform other general work with or
without training.
2.

Petitioner Hoskings can be trained for challenging

and higher paying jobs.

Based upon a vocational evaluation

of Petitioner Hoskings, Intracorp determined that he had the
capacity to learn and progress within his career field and
would be successful in long-term formal training in
preparation for more challenging and higher paying jobs.

He

manifested a suitable appearance and demeanor to pursue a
professional job search and his stable employment history
could be considered complimentary by prospective employers.
Petitioner Hoskings had no familial, legal or other personal
encumbrances affecting employability and he had adequate
transportation to acquire and maintain employment.

With

respect to physical limitations, no specific medical opinion
was on file to prohibit Petitioner Hoskings from returning
to a full-time work schedule under appropriate job demand
requirements.69

3.

There is work available to Petitioner Hoskings,

Intracorp identified general work that Petitioner Hoskings

68
69

R. at 238.
Facts paragraph 39.
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could perform with limited training based upon his
intelligence, education, work experience and physical
limitations.

Intracorp never conditioned the general work

available to him on the sympathy of friends or superhuman
efforts.
Admittedly, DRS determined that Petitioner Hoskings was
permanently disabled.

Petitioner Hoskings argues that the

report prepared by the DRS is a better evaluation than
Intracorp and asks this Court to re-weigh the DRS evaluation
against the report prepared by Intracorp.

This Court,

70

however, does not re-weigh the evidence.

Rather, this

Court will uphold the finding of the Commission if it is
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in the light
of the whole record before the Court. It is reasonable for
the Commission to give more weight to the Intracorp
evaluation.
The Intracorp report, viewed in light of Petitioner
Hoskings7 voluntary retirement, his work history before
retirement, his seasonal work after retirement and the
medical opinions in the record, supports the Commission's
conclusions that there is regular work available to

Van Leeuwen v. Industrial Commission, supra.
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Petitioner Hoskings and, therefore, he is not permanently
totally disabled.
4.

There is no requirement that the City become an

employment agency and find a specific job for Petitioner
Hoskings.

Petitioner Hoskings argues that the City must not

only prove that there is work of a general character which
he can perform or a person of his capabilities may be able
to learn to do; it must also lead him to a specific job
opportunity.

Although the Intracorp report identified work

that Petitioner Hoskings can, with his capabilities,
perform, he criticizes the evaluation because it did not
find him a specific job.
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Marshall v. Industrial
Commission,71

that workers may be found totally disabled if

they can no longer perform work of the general nature they
were performing when injured or any other work which persons
of their capabilities may be able to do or learn to do or
for which they might be trained.

There is no requirement

that the City must become an employment agency and find a
specific job for Petitioner Hoskings.

The City's burden is

only to show that there is general work which Petitioner

Marshall v. Industrial Commission, supra.
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Hoskings can perform with or without training based upon his
physical and educational ability, age and experience.

If

Petitioner Hoskings was correct, a finding of permanent
total disability would result by simply proving that one
cannot return to his former job, thereby encouraging injured
employees, rather than seeking rehabilitation, to avoid any
active effort to secure alternate employment.

This is

counter to all the innumerable projects, governmental, state
and federal and private, which look towards restoring to the
injured the opportunity to become useful, meaningful
citizens and human beings.72
Job availability should incorporate the answer to two
questions:

(1) Considering the claimants' age, background,

employment history and experience, what can claimants
physically and mentally do following their injury; that is,
what types of jobs are they capable of performing or capable
of being trained to do?

(2) Within the category of jobs

that claimants are reasonably capable of performing, are
there jobs reasonably available in the community for which
claimants are able to compete and which they could
realistically and likely procure?

72

See, New Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner. 661 F.2d 1031 (Fifth
Cir. 1981).
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The second question in effect requires a determination
of whether there exists a reasonable likelihood, given the
claimants' age, education and vocational background, that
they would be hired if they diligently sought the job.

If

alternate jobs exist which the claimants could reasonably
perform and secure had they diligently tried, the employer,
after demonstrating the existence of such jobs, has met its
burden.
Job availability should depend on whether there is a
reasonable opportunity for claimants to compete in a manner
normally pursued by persons genuinely seeking work with
their determined capabilities.

If it is established that

there are jobs which the claimants can realistically perform
and secure, there may not be a finding of total permanent
disability.

:

The employer's burden of demonstrating that

claimants are able to secure employment simply cannot amount
to a requirement that the employer either hire the claimants
or find them a guaranteed job.

"The employer does not have

to lead the claimant to water, only establish that water is
nearby which the claimant may drink if he reaches for it."

Id.
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Intracorp found there are jobs which Petitioner
Hoskings could do if he genuinely sought work with his
capabilities.

It was not unreasonable for the Commission to

rely on the Intracorp report combined with the other facts
surrounding Petitioner Hoskings' retirement and work history
and the medical evidence to conclude that there was regular
work available to him.

Since there is work available to

Petitioner Hoskings, the Commission is correct in finding
that he is not permanently totally disabled.
POINT II.
THE ISSUE OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
BENEFITS WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COMMISSION.
Petitioner Hoskings argues that, in the alternative,
the Commission should have awarded him permanent partial
disability benefits.

Based upon the pleadings and the

l

hearings, the issue was narrowed to whether Petitioner
Hoskings was entitled to permanent total disability.
Neither the Commission nor the ALJ reviewed evidence
regarding permanent partial impairment.

There is

conflicting medical information regarding permanent partial
impairment which will require further hearings before the
ALJ, a medical panel and ultimately the Commission.
76

R.

at 254.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Commission's
decision should be affirmed because there is substantial
evidence to support its finding that Petitioner Hoskings is
not permanently totally disabled.

Since the issue of

permanent partial impairment was not before the Commission
and the ALJ, a separate action must be commenced by
Petitioner Hoskings.

Regardless, the issue of permanent

partial disability is not before this Court.

DATED this

l^>

day of J^^^</W^^^~- / 1995.

FRANK M. NAKAMURA
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Salt Lake City
Corporation
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EXHIBIT_A
3'k-75

MUa/ifc

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
WARREN HOSKINGS,

*
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

vs.

*

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

*

*

Defendant.

*

Case No. 90-0401

Salt Lake City Corporation asks The Industrial Commission of
Utah to review an Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding
permanent total disability compensation to Warren Hoskings under
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Beginning in 1966, Mr. Hoskings worked for Salt Lake City as
a fireman. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1974, then captain in
the early 1980's.
While fighting a fire in 1980, Mr. Hoskings injured his left
ankle. He underwent surgery, but continued to experience pain. On
April 6, 1986, in the course of his employment, he reinjured his
left ankle. He received medical attention the next day and was
diagnosed with an acute ankle sprain and "calcaneus/cuboid joint
problem,ff
later
additionally
diagnosed
as
"traumatic
osteoarthritis".
Mr. Hoskings did not miss any work as a result of the April
1986 injury. However, he experienced chronic pain and difficulty
walking. He was examined by a number of different physicians who
attempted various conservative remedies without producing any
significant improvement.
On September 1, 1988, Mr. Hoskings accepted early retirement
from Salt Lake City. There is no indication that Mr. Hoskings'
work performance was unsatisfactory prior to his retirement, nor is
there any evidence Mr. Hoskings informed Salt Lake City that his
decision to retire was related to his ankle injury. However, Mr.
Hoskings now claims that his decision to retire was motivated by
his ankle injury.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
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Mr. Hoskings' impairment from his ankle injury has been rated
by several doctors in a range from 8% to 17% of the whole person.
The doctors also agree the injury causes Mr. Hoskings significant
pain and limits the mobility of the ankle.
After retiring, Mr. Hoskings worked as fire marshall for
Hamilton Stores in Yellowstone Park during the summers of 1990 and
1991.
Mr. Hoskings spent a substantial amount of his work day
driving from one store to another. He had no difficulty performing
the duties of the job. However, he chose to resign when the job
was changed to a year-around position because he believed the cold
winter temperatures in Yellowstone might aggravate his ankle injury
as well as a nonindustrial pulmonary condition.
At the time of his injury, Mr. Hoskings was 50 years old. He
is of above average intelligence and performs well on vocational
aptitude tests. He has completed a one-year technical program in
electronics and two years of university education. He has work
experience in electronics, as well as eight years experience with
the National Guard in transportation and supply services.
Two vocational rehabilitation studies have been performed on
Mr. Hoskings.
The first was conducted by the Division of
Rehabilitation Services (ffDRSfI) and concludes that Mr. Hoskings
cannot be rehabilitated.
The second was conducted at Salt Lake
City's request by Intracorp and concludes that Mr. Hoskings is a
suitable candidate for rehabilitation. The Intracorp study also
identifies work available throughout Utah which Mr. Hoskings can
perform. For reasons set forth below, the Industrial Commission
finds the Intracorp report to be persuasive on the issues of Mr.
Hoskings7 suitability for rehabilitation and the availability of
alternative work.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The ALJ has applied the correct framework in considering Mr.
Hoskings' claim for permanent total disability compensation.
First, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Hoskings7 industrial accident
caused the ankle injury which is now claimed to render him
disabled. The ALJ then applied the "odd-lot" doctrine to determine
whether Mr. Hoskings was permanently and totally disabled.
The odd lot doctrine is a three part test. Mr. Hoskings must
first prove that his ankle injury prevents him from returning to
his former occupation. Then he must demonstrate that he cannot be
rehabilitated. If Mr. Hoskings is successful in establishing these
two factors, the burden shifts to Salt Lake City to prove that
other work is available to Mr. Hoskings despite his injury.
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While the Industrial Commission agrees with the analytical
framework applied by the ALJ to Mr* Hoskings' claim, the Industrial
Commission does not agree with the ALJ's conclusions on two points:
First, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr. Hoskings can be
rehabilitated. Second, the Industrial Commission finds that other
work is available that Mr. Hoskings can perform, despite his ankle
injury.
On the issue of Mr. Hoskings' ability to be rehabilitated, the
Industrial Commission has carefully reviewed the DRS report, which
concludes that Mr. Hoskings was "unable to demonstrate the stamina
and endurance needed to work in full-time employment." However,
the report makes no distinction between sedentary work and more
strenuous employment.
It does not address the fact that Mr.
Hoskings' employment at Hamilton Stores demonstrated some ability
to work. It makes no reference to Mr. Hoskings' intelligence,
education, adaptability, or wide range of prior work experience.
The Industrial Commission has also reviewed the deposition of Mr.
Miera, a rehabilitation counselor with DRS, but Mr. Miera's
testimony adds little to support the DRS report.
In contrast to the DRS report, the Intracorp report identifies
Mr. Hoskings' training, experience and abilities. It specifically
addresses the effects of Mr. Hoskings' ankle injury and other
medical conditions.
The Intracorp report then analyzes the
foregoing factors and concludes that Mr. Hoskings can be
rehabilitated. Intracorp's conclusion is corroborated by the fact
that Mr. Hoskings found other work at Hamilton Stores and
successfully performed his employment duties there. The Industrial
Commission is persuaded by Intracorp's objective data and
subjective analysis.
Although Mr. Hoskings can be rehabilitated and therefore fails
to meet the second element of the odd lot doctrine, the Industrial
Commission will consider the third element of the odd lot doctrine.
This third element requires Salt Lake City to show that other work
is available to Mr. Hoskings.
The Intracorp report contains a detailed list and discussion
of employment opportunities within Mr. Hoskings' abilities. Such
employment opportunities exist primarily in the Salt Lake
metropolitan area, but also are present throughout Utah.
The
record contains no significant evidence contradicting the Intracorp
report on this point. Consequently, the Industrial Commission
finds that regular, dependable employment is available within Mr.
Hoskings' abilities.
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In summary, the Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ that
Mr. Hoskings' industrial accident caused his ankle injury and that
he cannot return t<? work as a fire fighter. However, contrary to
the ALJ's decision, the Industrial Commission finds that Mr.
Hoskings can be rehabilitated and that regular, dependable work is
available to 1dm in otliex branches oi tlie labor market.
The
Industrial Commission therefore concludes that Mr. Hoskings is not
entitled to permanent total disability compensation within the
meaning of §35-1-67 of the Utah Workers7 Compensation Act.
In light of the Industrial Commission's determination that Mr.
Hoskings
is
not
entitled
to permanent
total
disability
compensation, it is unnecessary to address Mr. Hoskings' argument
regarding the date on which compensation should begin.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission reverses the ALJ's decision in this
matter and hereby denies Mr. Hoskings claim for permanent total
disability compensation. It is so ordered.
Dated t h i s 3 ^ ± ^ d a y of March, 1995.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this
Order.
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CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion
For Review in the matter of Warren Hoskings v. Salt Lake City
Corporation, Case No. 90-0401, was mailed, first class postage
prepaid, thisJs^JMay of March, 1995, to the following:
WARREN HOSKINGS
45 EAST 200 NORTH
IVIN, UTAH 84123
JAMES BLACK
ATTORNEY AT LAW
800 KENNECOTT BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
FRANK NAKAMURA
ATTORNEY AT LAW
451 SOUTH STATE STREET
SUITE 505
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
ERIE V. BOORMAN
ADMINISTRATOR
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
P. 0. BOX 146611
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6611

-Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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35-1-67

LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure and payments.
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66%% of
his average weekly wages at the time of \he injury, but not more than a
maximum of 85% of the siate average weekly wage at the time of the iryury
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of
18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not
to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be required to pay weekly compensation
payments for more than 312 weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such
time as the following proceedings have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for
rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order
paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the
rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabilitation and training
of the employee shall generally follow the practice applicable under
§ 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of
education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing that the,
employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabilitation
in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall order that there
be paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662/3% of his average
weekly wages at the time of the iryury, but not more than a maximum of
85% of the state average Weekly wage at the |;ime of the injury per week
and not less than ft minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent
spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the'employee at the tirqe of the injury, but not to exceed
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out
of the second iryury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such
period of time beginning with the time that the payments, as in this section
provided, to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and
ending with the death of the employee. No employee shall be entitled to
any such benefits if he fails or refuses to cooperate with the division of
vocational rehabilitation under this section.
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All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to
benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120
per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with
compensation payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational
training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission
shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the
provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in those instances. In all other cases where there has been
rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the
award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for
312 weeks.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 78; C.L. 1917,
( 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51,
|3l; C. 1943, 42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, 5 1;
1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch.
57,'§ 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1;
1961, ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch.
68, 5 1; 1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5;
1971, ch. 76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch.
13, § lj 1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150,
S*l; 1977, ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6;
1979, chi 138, § 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983,
ch. 356, § 1; 1985, ch. 160, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1975 amendment substituted "85% of the state average
weekly wage" for "662/3% of the state average
weekly wage" four times in the first paragraph and once in the last paragraph; increased the minimum benefit per week from
$36* to $45 in the first paragraph; inserted
"not to exceed the average weekly wage of
the employee at the time of the injury" twice
(n the. first paragraph; increased the benefit
per * week from $50 to $60 at the end of the
third paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend-

ment) and near the end of the fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amendment); and
substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 1, 1974"
in the fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977
amendment).
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substituted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph.
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by
chapter 151; combined the first two paragraphs into one paragraph; inserted the seeond paragraph; and deleted the former third
and fourth paragraphs which read: "Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are
permanently and totally disabled and on that
date or prior thereto were receiving compensation benefits from the special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per
week.
"Commencing July 1,1975, all persons who
were permanently and totally disabled on or
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving
compensation benefits and continue to re-
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990,
ch. 132, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,1990, added the exception at the end of Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Final agency action.
Function of district court.
Right to judicial proceeding.
Cited,
„. ,
^
Final agency action.
Industrial Commission's determination of
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not
reviewable under this section, because the
commission and the parties had not resolved
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
•,
..
... ,. .
.
™ ? o n ® f *i?V^C°Urh
>u • i, r ,
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,
the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-

ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily
delegated to the district court is to review informal agency adjudicative proceedings. State
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App.
K
J
*
™
1990)
Right to judicial proceeding.
District court erred in declining a de novo
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reciprocity, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hearing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & ProSessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah C t
*
A
1991)
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
eview of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agenc>*s prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agency action.
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Factual findings.
Final order.
Function of district court.
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Review.
Standard of review.
—Interpretation of statutory term.
—Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.
Agency action.
Whether the Industrial Commission acted
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Indus-

trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
Applicability of section.
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
should not be granted when, although the
agency committed error, the error was harmless. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Arbitrary action.
Industrial commission's denial of occupational disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v.
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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